Mughal Diplomacy and Foreign Relations
The Mughal state was a major participant in the early modern diplomatic system, and the conduct of foreign relations was an important function of imperial government. From the embassies exchanged with the Safavid shahs and the Ottoman sultans in the sixteenth century to the European trading companies that established coastal factories in the seventeenth, the Mughals maintained a continuous and sophisticated diplomatic engagement with the wider world. The principal foreign interlocutors, the major diplomatic episodes, and the institutions of Mughal diplomacy are the subject of this page. The broader administrative framework is surveyed in the Mughal administration overview, the imperial household that hosted the foreign envoys is treated on the Mughal court and nobility page, and the military context of many of the diplomatic episodes is examined in the Mughal military pillar.
The Major Powers
The principal foreign interlocutors of the Mughals were the three great Islamic empires of the early modern period — the Safavid dynasty of Iran (1501–1736), the Ottoman Empire of Turkey (c. 1299–1922), and the Uzbek khanates of Central Asia — together with the various Central Asian and steppe polities on the northwestern frontier, the kingdoms of the Deccan and the south, the Rajput principalities of western India, the Tibetan and Chinese authorities on the northeastern frontier, and the European trading companies (Portuguese, English, Dutch, and French) that established coastal factories during the seventeenth century. The diplomatic relations of the Mughals with each of these powers were shaped by geography, commerce, religion, and the long history of Islamic statecraft in the region.
The Safavid Empire, ruled from Isfahan by a dynasty that claimed descent from the Twelver Shia imams, was the nearest and most substantial of the Mughal’s western neighbors. The two empires shared a long border, much of it in the strategically vital region of Qandahar and the Afghan highlands, and the relations between them were a mixture of commercial exchange, diplomatic rivalry, and intermittent warfare. The Ottoman Empire, the largest and most powerful of the Islamic states, was geographically more distant but claimed the caliphate and a special religious authority over the Sunni world. The Mughal-Ottoman relationship was conducted through embassies and through the Indian Ocean trade, and the two empires were generally on cordial terms, with a shared interest in containing Safavid power.
The Uzbek khanates of Central Asia, ruling from Bukhara and Samarkand, were the heirs of the Timurid tradition and the closest in language and culture to the Mughals. The Mughal Uzbeks rivalry was a long-running feature of the dynasty’s foreign relations, and the recurrent Mughal campaigns in Central Asia, especially under Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb, were conducted in part against the Uzbek threat.
The Mughal Diplomatic System
The Mughal diplomatic system was organized around the dar-ul-insha (imperial chancery), which drafted and issued the firmans, parwanahs (provincial orders), and letters patent that constituted the formal diplomatic record. The emperor was the sole source of diplomatic authority, and the senior ministers, particularly the wazir and the mir bakhshi, played important coordinating roles. The mir bakhshi was often responsible for the reception of foreign envoys, and the dar-ul-insha prepared the elaborate mukarrar (credentials) and the qasida (formal Persian ode) that accompanied the imperial response.
The Mughal practice of maintaining resident envoys at foreign courts, exchanging gifts, and corresponding directly with foreign rulers was well established by Akbar’s reign. The emperor maintained a detailed record of foreign embassies, and the Ain-i-Akbari includes a careful account of the diplomatic protocol. The Mughal emperor’s shamshir-i-Hindu (sword of India) and his titles, including Shahanshah-i-Hind (King of Kings of India) and Sultan ul-Islam (Sovereign of Islam), were the principal instruments of his diplomatic claim.
Relations with the Safavids
The Mughal-Safavid relationship was the most important of the dynasty’s foreign engagements. The two empires shared a long border, a common Persian cultural heritage, and a long history of diplomatic and commercial exchange. The principal bone of contention was the city of Qandahar, which the Safavids had held since the sixteenth century and which the Mughals regarded as a vital strategic and commercial prize. The Qandahar question was the subject of three Mughal-Safavid wars, in 1598 (under Akbar), 1622 (under Shah Jahan), and 1649 (under Shah Jahan), and the city changed hands several times before being permanently lost to the Safavids in 1649.
The diplomatic exchanges between the Mughals and the Safavids were elaborate and continuous. The Mughal embassy to the court of Shah Tahmasp in 1574 was one of the earliest formal contacts, and the embassies continued throughout the seventeenth century. The Mughal-Safavid diplomatic correspondence, much of which survives in the Inshā-i-Abu’l Fazl and other collections, is a major source for the study of early modern Islamic statecraft. The embassies typically included substantial gifts, including horses, textiles, and jewels from the Mughal side and horses, carpets, and Persian manuscripts from the Safavid side.
The Qandahar Question
The Qandahar question is a paradigm of early modern diplomatic conflict. The city of Qandahar, situated on the high road between Kabul and Isfahan, was a vital strategic and commercial center, controlling the routes from India to Iran and from Iran to Central Asia. The Safavids had held the city since 1558, and the Mughals had long regarded it as a lost Timurid possession. Akbar’s conquest of Qandahar in 1598 was a major diplomatic and military event, and the city’s capture was celebrated in the contemporary chronicles. The Safavids recovered the city in 1622, during a period of Mughal weakness under Jahangir, and Shah Jahan’s two attempts to recover it, in 1649 and the early 1650s, ended in failure. The Mughals’ permanent loss of Qandahar in 1649 was a major diplomatic setback, and the city’s loss was closely tied to the broader regional politics of the period.
Shah Jahan’s Central Asian Campaigns
The Central Asian campaigns of Shah Jahan, especially those of 1646–1647 and 1649, represent a major effort to project Mughal power into the ancestral Timurid heartland. The campaigns aimed at the recovery of Balkh and Badakhshan, the northern provinces of the Timurid inheritance, from the Uzbek and other Central Asian powers. The campaigns involved substantial military forces and the deployment of the empire’s principal commanders, including Prince Murad Baksh and Prince Muhammad Aurangzeb. The campaigns ended in failure, principally because of the difficulty of the logistics, the hostility of the local population, and the strength of the Uzbek defense, but they demonstrated the Mughal Empire’s continuing interest in the Central Asian stage and the dynasty’s continuing claim to a wider imperial role.
Aurangzeb’s correspondence with the Central Asian powers, especially the Uzbek rulers of Bukhara and the Persian Safavids, is a major source for the study of Mughal diplomacy. The emperor’s letters, drafted by the dar-ul-insha and dispatched through the elaborate dak chowki postal system, are a remarkable record of the imperial mind, and they reveal the emperor’s view of the world, his conception of the imperial mission, and his diplomatic calculations.
Relations with the Ottomans
The Mughal-Ottoman relationship was more distant than the Mughal-Safavid one, and the two empires generally maintained cordial relations. The Mughal emperor was recognized by the Ottoman sultan as a major Muslim sovereign, and the two exchanged embassies on several occasions. The Mughal-Ottoman diplomatic correspondence is preserved in part in the archives of the Topkapi Palace in Istanbul, and it provides valuable evidence of the diplomatic protocols of the period. The principal subjects of the correspondence were the Indian Ocean trade, the threat of the Safavids, and the general affairs of the Islamic world. The Mughals and Ottomans shared an interest in containing Safavid expansion, and the two empires generally avoided direct conflict.
The Mughal-Ottoman relationship was complicated by the question of the caliphate. The Ottoman sultan claimed the caliphate as a central element of his legitimacy, while the Mughal emperor claimed the title Sultan ul-Islam and other imperial titles that implied a similar religious authority. The two claims were never directly contested, and the two empires generally avoided confrontations over the question. The diplomatic correspondence, however, suggests that the question was a matter of mutual sensitivity, and the two empires handled the religious dimension of their relationship with care.
Relations with the European Trading Companies
The European trading companies were a novel element in the Mughal diplomatic system, and the relations between the Mughals and the Portuguese, English, Dutch, and French companies were conducted on principles that combined commerce, diplomacy, and the projection of European naval power. The Portuguese had been the earliest European presence in the Indian Ocean, and they had established a substantial presence at Goa, Daman, Diu, and Bassein by the sixteenth century. The English East India Company, founded by royal charter in 1600, established its first factory at Surat in 1612 and gradually expanded its presence along the coast. The Dutch Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), founded in 1602, established its principal base in the East Indies but maintained important interests in the Indian Ocean. The French Compagnie des Indes orientales, founded in 1664, was a later arrival, and its principal base was at Pondicherry.
The Mughal diplomatic relations with the European companies were conducted through the dar-ul-insha and the wazir’s office, and the farmans issued to the European companies were a major element of the imperial record. The English, in particular, sought and obtained several important farmans granting the Company the right to trade in the Mughal territories, the most celebrated of which was the farman of 1717 issued by the Mughal emperor Farrukhsiyar. The European companies maintained ambassadors and agents at the Mughal court, and the embassies were a major feature of the imperial capital’s diplomatic life.
The Portuguese presence at Goa was particularly important. The Estado da India, with its capital at Goa, was the principal Portuguese outpost in the East, and the city’s cathedral, churches, and convents were major centers of European culture. The Jesuits, in particular, were active at the Mughal court, and the visits of Jesuit missionaries to the court of Akbar and his successors are an important feature of the cultural history of the period. The Jesuit accounts of the Mughal court, including the letters of the Jesuit fathers and the Akbarnama of the Jesuit author, are major sources for the cultural and intellectual life of the empire.
Sir Thomas Roe and the English Embassy to Jahangir
The embassy of Sir Thomas Roe, the English ambassador to the court of Jahangir in 1615–1619, is a landmark in the history of Mughal-European diplomatic relations. Roe was a sophisticated and observant diplomat, and his Journal of the embassy, edited by William Foster, is a major source for the political, social, and economic life of the early seventeenth-century Mughal court. The embassy was sent by King James I of England and was intended to establish the English East India Company’s commercial position in India and to secure the right of the Company to trade at Surat and other Mughal ports.
Roe’s embassy is notable for several reasons. It established the English Company’s diplomatic position at the Mughal court, and the Company’s subsequent relations with the imperial government were conducted in the pattern established by Roe. It was also a major cultural event, and Roe’s descriptions of the court, the emperor, the nobles, and the imperial ceremonies are a major source for the visual and social history of the period. The embassy’s negotiations with the wazir and the dar-ul-insha are an important case study in the practice of Mughal diplomacy.
Diplomatic Gifts and the Symbolic Competition for Legitimacy
The diplomatic system of the early modern world relied heavily on the exchange of gifts, and the Mughals were active participants in this practice. The Mughal emperor sent elaborate gifts to the Safavid, Ottoman, and other foreign rulers, and the gifts typically included horses (a Mughal specialty), textiles, jewels, and elaborate gold and silver objects. The foreign rulers, in turn, sent gifts of comparable value, and the diplomatic correspondence was often punctuated by the exchange of gifts on the occasion of coronations, marriages, and other important events.
The diplomatic gifts were not merely a courtesy; they were a means of symbolic communication, and the choice and presentation of the gifts conveyed messages about the power, wealth, and culture of the sender. The Mughal emperor’s gifts, which were often elaborately inscribed with the imperial titles and accompanied by elaborate qasidas in Persian, were an important element of the imperial claim to a universal Islamic sovereignty. The diplomatic gifts, and the responses of the foreign rulers, are examined in detail in the Mughal court and nobility page, and the Mughal art and painting page treats the cultural products of the court in greater detail.
The Symbolic Competition for Legitimacy
The Mughal diplomatic system was, in part, a competition for symbolic legitimacy among the great Islamic empires of the early modern period. The Mughal emperor’s claim to the title Shahanshah-i-Hind (King of Kings of India) and Sultan ul-Islam (Sovereign of Islam) was contested in part by the Ottoman sultan’s claim to the caliphate and the Safavid shah’s claim to the leadership of the Shia world. The diplomatic correspondence, the gifts, the inscriptions on the imperial coins, and the elaborate titles of the emperor were all elements of this competition, and the diplomatic system was, in this sense, a continuation of the political and religious rivalries of the Islamic world by other means.
The symbolic competition for legitimacy was carried on through the institutions of the court, the army, the revenue administration, and the religious and cultural patronage of the empire. The history of the dynasty is in substantial part a history of this competition, and the decline of the Mughal Empire is in part a story of the failure of the imperial system to maintain its symbolic and material authority in the face of the European, Persian, and Afghan challenges of the eighteenth century.
Sources
- John F. Richards, The Mughal Empire (NCHI I.5, 1993), ch. 8.
- Muzaffar Alam, The Mughals and the Sufis (2012), on Safavid and Uzbek relations.