The Mughal Intelligence Network: Waqia-Navis, Dak Chowki, and Imperial Spies
The Mughal empire maintained intelligence and communications systems of the early modern world, and the speed with which information travelled from the farthest provinces to the imperial court, and the detail with which the central government was kept informed of provincial events, were the basis of the dynasty’s effective rule over a vast and diverse subcontinent. The present page treats the waqia-navis and the sawanih-navis, the sara-i and the dak chowki postal system, the spy networks, the role of the spymaster, the speed of information transmission, the famous intelligence reports, and the use of the intelligence in imperial decision-making. The broader administrative framework is surveyed in the Mughal administration overview, and the related bureaucratic apparatus is treated in the Mughal bureaucracy page.
The Waqia-Navis and the Sawanih-Navis
The intelligence arm of the Mughal government was the network of waqia-navis, the news reporters, and sawanih-navis, the annals writers. The two offices were often held by the same person, and the distinction between them is a distinction of function rather than of personnel. The waqia-navis, the news reporter, was an officer stationed in each important city, fort, and provincial capital, and his duty was to send a regular weekly or fortnightly report, the waqia, of all newsworthy events in his area to the imperial court. The reports were written in Persian, in a standardized form, and were addressed to the emperor, the mir bakhshi, the diwan, or the sadr-us-sudur, depending on the subject.
The waqia covered an extensive range of subjects. The reporter was expected to record the administrative changes in his area, the appointments and transfers of officials, the movements of the mansabdars and the provincial governors, the state of the crops and the harvest prospects, the prices in the bazaar, the condition of the roads, the behaviour of the local officials, the arrival and departure of foreign envoys and merchants, the conduct of the religious leaders, the rumours in the city, and the gossip of the court. The report was generally a written document, but in the case of urgent news the waqia-navis could send a verbal report by a special courier.
The sawanih-navis, the annals writer, was a parallel officer whose duty was to maintain a continuous record of events in his area over a longer period. The sawanih-navis’s reports, the sawanih, were more historical in character than the waqia and were intended to provide the central government with an annual or biennial summary of provincial events. The sawanih-navis maintained a chronological record, the tarikh, of the major events of his area, and the record was transmitted to the centre at regular intervals. The sawanih-navis was, in this sense, the predecessor of the modern provincial gazetteer officer, and the sawanih records are an important primary source for the provincial history of the Mughal period.
The two offices were supplemented by the insha or secretariat of the mir saman, the confidential correspondent who maintained a private line of communication with the emperor on matters of particular sensitivity. The insha officer was generally a trusted servant of the emperor, and the insha’s letters were written in a more personal style than the formal waqia. The insha was, in effect, the emperor’s personal intelligence officer in the province, and the insha’s reports were treated as more reliable than the formal waqia of the local officer.
The Sara-i and the Dak Chowki
The reports of the waqia-navis and the sawanih-navis, the orders of the emperor, and the routine correspondence of the central and provincial offices travelled by the dak chowki, the imperial postal and courier system. The dak chowki consisted of a chain of post-houses, the sara-i or rest houses, placed at intervals of approximately ten to fifteen miles along the principal roads of the empire. At each sara-i a relay of runners, the dak runners or qasid, was maintained, and the imperial dispatches were passed from one runner to the next, day and night, until they reached their destination. The system was supplemented by a body of mounted couriers, the piyada-i-dak or foot couriers and the sawari-i-dak or horse couriers, for urgent messages.
The sara-i was a substantial establishment, generally consisting of a walled enclosure containing the runners’ quarters, the stables, the kitchens, the office, and the quarters for official travellers. The sara-i was maintained by a darogha or superintendent appointed by the provincial governor, and the darogha was responsible for the readiness of the runners, the maintenance of the stock, the security of the dispatches, and the comfort of the official travellers. The sara-i was a vital link in the communications system, and the breakdown of the sara-i was a serious problem, generally treated as a sign of provincial disorder.
The speed of the dak chowki was remarkable by the standards of the early modern world. A dispatch from Kabul could reach Delhi in seven to ten days, a dispatch from Lahore to Agra in three to four days, a dispatch from Ahmedabad to Delhi in five to six days, and a dispatch from Bengal to Delhi in ten to twelve days. The speed was not uniform across the empire, and the speed depended on the condition of the road, the season, the political situation, and the urgency of the dispatch. The dak chowki was, however, generally faster than the European postal systems of the same period.
The Spy Networks
The waqia-navis and the sawanih-navis were the formal intelligence officers, but the Mughal government also maintained a parallel network of informal spies, the jasus or khabir, who reported directly to the emperor, the wazir, the mir bakhshi, or the provincial governor. The jasus was generally a person of low social status, often a merchant, a darwish, a qalandar, or a servant, who had access to places and conversations that the formal officer could not easily reach. The jasus’s reports were sent in sealed letters, generally by special couriers, and the jasus’s identity was known only to the recipient.
The jasus network was particularly important in the reporting of conspiracies, in the surveillance of the great nobles, and in the early detection of rebellions. The jasus was generally well rewarded, and the jasus who provided valuable information was often given a mansab rank and a jagir. The jasus was, however, exposed to the danger of retaliation, and the jasus who was discovered in a noble’s household was generally put to death. The jasus network was, in this sense, a high-risk instrument, and the emperor’s reliance on the jasus was a sign of his seriousness about the intelligence function.
The Mughal spymaster was generally the mir bakhshi or, in some periods, a separate sahib-i-jasus or master of spies. The mir bakhshi’s office was responsible for the maintenance of the registers of the mansabdari nobility, for the supervision of the jagir assignments, and for the operation of the dak chowki. The sahib-i-jasus, where the office existed separately, was a more specialized intelligence officer, and the sahib-i-jasus’s reports were treated as a particularly sensitive category.
The Use in Decision-Making
The intelligence and communications network was not a passive instrument. The information collected by the waqia-navis, the sawanih-navis, and the jasus was used actively in imperial decision-making, and the emperor’s responses to the information were transmitted back to the provinces by the same dak chowki. The information was used in the appointment and transfer of officials, in the assessment of the revenue, in the disposition of the army, in the management of the succession, in the negotiation of treaties, and in the repression of rebellion.
The most famous examples of the use of the intelligence network are from the reign of Akbar. The Ain-i-Akbari contains a celebrated account of the waqia-navis network, and the Akbarnama records numerous cases in which the emperor’s decisions were directly based on the information received. The intelligence network was, in this sense, the principal means by which the emperor’s personal authority was maintained over a vast and diverse empire.
The intelligence network had its limitations. The information could be biased, the waqia-navis could be bribed or intimidated, the jasus could be turned, and the dak chowki could be disrupted. The Mughal state recognized these limitations, and the system was supplemented by the rotation of officers, the inspection tours, and the cross-checking of reports. The Mughal government was, in the high period of the empire, one of the best-informed governments in the world. The intelligence network declined in effectiveness in the eighteenth century, as the empire contracted.
Sources
- Muzaffar Alam, The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India (1986), ch. 2.