The Decline of the Mughal Military
The Crisis of the Mansabdari-Jagirdari System
The mansabdari-jagirdari system, examined in detail on the Mughal mansabdari page, was the foundation of the Mughal military system. Each mansabdar was required to maintain a prescribed number of cavalry, with a prescribed number of horses of a prescribed quality, in return for the assignment of a jagir, or the right to collect the revenue of a specified tract of land. The system worked well in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the supply of jagirs was broadly adequate to the demands of the mansabdari ranks. By the early eighteenth century, however, the system had fallen into a profound crisis. The number of mansabdars had multiplied, the supply of jagirs had failed to keep pace, and many mansabdars were assigned jagirs that were either insufficient in revenue or that were located at a great distance from their actual驻地. The result was a substantial decline in the actual strength and quality of the mansabdari contingents, and the formal musters of the imperial army became increasingly fictional exercises.
The Shortage of Cavalry and the Decline in Artillery Quality
The shortage of cavalry was the most visible symptom of the military decline. The Mughal army had always been predominantly a cavalry army, and the formal mansabdari returns counted men, horses, and beasts of transport rather than infantrymen and cannon. By the early eighteenth century, the actual number of cavalry that could be put into the field was substantially smaller than the formal returns suggested, and the quality of the cavalry, in terms of the standard of horses, of equipment, and of training, had declined markedly. The most prestigious cavalry, the walashah and the ahadi, were still well-mounted and well-trained, but the bulk of the mansabdari cavalry consisted of men on inferior horses, often without proper equipment, and sometimes without the prescribed number of horses per man.
The decline in artillery quality was equally significant. The Mughal artillery had been one of the most impressive military establishments of the seventeenth century, and the great sieges of the dynasty, including the sieges of Bijapur and Golconda, had been conducted with substantial artillery trains. By the early eighteenth century, however, the imperial topkhana had fallen into a serious decline. The foundries of Agra, Delhi, and Lahore, treated on the Mughal cannon foundries page, had reduced their output, the technical skill of the imperial armourers had declined, and the artillery train that accompanied the Mughal army on campaign was a pale shadow of the great trains of the seventeenth century. The decline in artillery quality was a major factor in the Mughal defeats of the eighteenth century, including the Battle of Karnal in 1739 against the Persian army of Nadir Shah.
The Corruption and the Indiscipline of the Officer Corps
The corruption and the indiscipline of the officer corps was a further symptom of the broader crisis. The mansabdari ranks, which had been filled in the seventeenth century by men of proven military and administrative ability, came to be filled increasingly by men who had purchased their rank or who had inherited it as a form of property. The discipline of the army suffered, and the formal musters became increasingly fictional exercises, with mansabdars presenting paper contingents that existed only in the returns. The chains of command, examined in the Mughal army organisation page, broke down, and the army became a collection of semi-independent contingents whose loyalty was to their immediate commanders rather than to the emperor.
The Rise of the European-Style Infantry and Artillery
The rise of the European-style infantry and artillery in the eighteenth century was a direct consequence of the British and French presence in India. The British East India Company, the French East India Company, and the various Indian successors of the Mughal Empire all began to recruit infantry units trained in the European linear tactics of the period, and these units, equipped with flintlock muskets and well-served by European-style artillery, were substantially more effective than the traditional Mughal matchlock infantry. The Indian succession states, including the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Nawab of Awadh, and the ruler of Mysore, all employed European-style infantry in substantial numbers, and the British victories of the eighteenth century, treated on the Battle of Plassey and Battle of Buxar pages, were a direct consequence of this military revolution.
The Mughal army was slow to adapt to the new military reality, and the failure to adopt the European-style infantry and the flintlock musket was one of the principal causes of the Mughal military decline. The traditional matchlock, treated on the Mughal matchlock weaponry page, was increasingly obsolete in the face of the disciplined volleys of the European-trained infantry, and the Mughal artillery, traditionally the most impressive component of the army, was also falling behind the European standard.
The Impact of the Maratha, Jat, Sikh, and Afghan Challenges
The Maratha, Jat, Sikh, and Afghan challenges to Mughal authority placed the declining Mughal military under additional pressure. The Marathas, in particular, developed a highly effective light cavalry force, the bargi and shiledar horsemen, that was ideally suited to the conditions of the Deccan and central India, and the Maratha light cavalry was able to defeat the traditional Mughal cavalry in the open field. The Maratha expansion, examined on the rise of the Maratha power page, was a major factor in the Mughal military decline, and the Third Battle of Panipat in 1761 was a direct consequence of the Maratha expansion.
The Jat rising, the Sikh rising, and the Afghan invasions of the eighteenth century placed additional pressure on the Mughal military. The Jat rising in the Agra region, beginning in the late seventeenth century, was a persistent drain on imperial resources, and the Sikh rising in the Punjab, examined on the rise of the Sikh power page, eventually resulted in the loss of the entire western Punjab. The Afghan invasions of the 1740s and 1750s, culminating in the Third Battle of Panipat in 1761, placed the Mughal heartland under direct military threat, and the Mughal military was unable to mount an effective response.
The Legacy of the Military Decline
Sources
- Muzaffar Alam, The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India (1986), ch. 5.