Aurangzeb’s Religious Policies and the Late Mughal Empire
The religious policies of Aurangzeb, the sixth Mughal emperor, are among the most debated subjects in South Asian historiography. They include the reimposition of the jizya in 1679, the destruction of prominent Hindu temples, the dismissal of Hindu musicians and painters from the imperial court, the restriction of music in the imperial household, the preferential treatment of Muslim officials in the imperial service, and the attempted suppression of heterodox Sufi and Shia practices. The principal treatment of the broader context of religious policy in the late empire is the religious policies and alienation of subject communities page, and the broader biographical context is given in the life and reign of Aurangzeb. This page focuses on the specific measures of Aurangzeb’s reign, the institutional context in which they were taken, and the historical debate over their significance.
The Reimposition of the Jizya 1679
The single most consequential religious act of Aurangzeb’s reign was the reimposition of the jizya, the poll tax on non-Muslim adult males, in April 1679. The jizya had been abolished by Akbar the Great in 1564 as part of the policy of religious conciliation associated with the Din-i-Ilahi and the mazhar of 1582, and its reimposition after more than a century was a major symbolic event. The reimposition was undertaken after consultation with the imperial ulama and the chief qazi, and it was enforced rigorously throughout the empire, with provincial officials instructed to ensure that all non-Muslim adult males of taxable status paid the tax.
The financial yield of the jizya was modest in fiscal terms, perhaps a small percentage of the total imperial revenue, and the tax’s principal significance was symbolic. The reimposition was widely interpreted by the empire’s Hindu, Jain, and Sikh subjects as a sign that the Mughal state had abandoned the policy of religious conciliation that had been in place for more than a century, and the reaction was major. The Rajas of Mewar and Jodhpur, long-standing allies of the Mughal dynasty, regarded the reimposition as a particular affront, and the resentment contributed to the political upheavals of the late seventeenth century. The connection between the reimposition and the broader pattern of alienation is examined in the religious policies and alienation of subject communities page.
The Destruction of Temples
Aurangzeb’s reign was marked by the destruction of a number of important Hindu temples. The most prominent of these included the Keshav Dev temple at Mathura, built on the site of a converted mosque, destroyed in 1669; the Vishwanath temple at Varanasi, one of the holiest sites of Hindu pilgrimage, destroyed in 1669; and the Somnath temple in Gujarat, on the traditional site of the temple destroyed by Mahmud of Ghazni, destroyed in 1701. A significant number of other temples were destroyed in the course of the Deccan campaigns and the operations in Rajasthan and the Punjab.
The historical debate over the temple destructions is significant. The traditional view, dominant in British colonial and early Indian nationalist historiography, treated the destructions as evidence of a systematic anti-Hindu policy. The more recent revisionist view, associated with historians such as Audrey Truschke, has argued that the destructions were responses to specific local circumstances, particularly the alleged construction of temples on the sites of demolished mosques, and that they should be understood in the context of the political conflicts of the period rather than as evidence of a comprehensive anti-Hindu policy. The political significance of the destructions, however, is not in doubt. The destruction of the Vishwanath temple at Varanasi, in particular, was a major symbolic event that contributed significantly to the sense of grievance that animated the Maratha resistance, the Sikh resistance, and the Rajput resistance of the late seventeenth century.
The Ban on Music and the Dismissal of Hindu Artists
Aurangzeb’s reign also saw the imposition of restrictions on the practice of music at the imperial court. The traditional account, derived from contemporary chroniclers, holds that Aurangzeb dismissed the musicians and singers of the imperial khas mahal on the grounds that music was religiously questionable, and the chroniclers record that the musicians were paid off with considerable grants and dispersed to the provincial courts. The same period saw the dismissal of a major portion of the Hindu painters and calligraphers of the imperial kitabkhana, the royal atelier, and the dispersal of the artists to the regional courts.
The traditional explanation for these measures was that they reflected a more rigorous Islamic policy that regarded music and painting as religiously questionable. The dismissal of the Hindu musicians and painters had both a religious and an economic dimension: it deprived the imperial court of a significant body of artistic talent and contributed to the dispersal of the Mughal artistic tradition to the regional successor states of the eighteenth century, particularly Hyderabad, Awadh, and the Rajput courts. The cultural consequences of the dispersal are examined in the Mughal culture and society and Mughal art pages.
The Role of the Qazi and the Sadr-us-Sudur
The institutional context of Aurangzeb’s religious policies is essential to understanding them. The two principal offices involved were the qazi (judge of Islamic law) and the sadr-us-sudur (the chief of the religious endowments department). The qazi of the imperial capital was the senior judicial officer of the empire, and the provincial qazis were the senior judicial officers of the provinces. The sadr-us-sudur was the head of the department that administered religious endowments, oversaw the appointment of religious officials, and reviewed the religious conduct of imperial officers. Both offices had been significantly developed under Akbar and Jahangir, and Aurangzeb’s religious policies were, in considerable measure, implemented through these offices.
The sadr-us-sudur under Aurangzeb, particularly Mulla Abdul Wahhab and his successors, was a major figure in the imperial government, and the office was used as a vehicle for the implementation of the emperor’s religious policies. The qazi of Delhi, Mulla Abdul Wahhab before his appointment as sadr-us-sudur and his successors in the office, was a major figure in the religious politics of the reign, and the chroniclers record the major influence of the ulama on the imperial government.
The Syncretic Sufi Traditions and the Reaction
Aurangzeb’s religious policies should be understood in the context of the significant revival of orthodox Islamic piety that marked the late seventeenth century. The syncretic Sufi traditions associated with Akbar’s Din-i-Ilahi and the broader policy of religious conciliation had never been universally accepted among the ulama, and the late seventeenth century saw a considerable revival of orthodox Sunni piety that found a ready audience in the imperial court. The Naqshbandi and Chishti Sufi orders, both of which had a major presence at the imperial court, were divided in their reaction to the new policies, and the Chishti order in particular was divided between a faction that supported Aurangzeb’s policies and a faction that opposed them.
The relationship between Aurangzeb and the syncretic Sufi traditions was complex. The emperor was personally devout in his observance of Islamic law, and he maintained the significant patronage of the Sufi orders that had been a feature of Mughal policy since Akbar’s time. The destruction of the Chishti khanaqah at Ajmer, the shrine of Muin-ud-din Chishti, by Aurangzeb’s general is sometimes cited as evidence of the emperor’s hostility to the syncretic traditions, but the evidence is disputed. The broader pattern of Aurangzeb’s religious policy is examined in the religious policies and alienation of subject communities page.
Comparison with Akbar’s Policies
The contrast between Aurangzeb’s religious policies and those of Akbar the Great is the most striking feature of the late Mughal religious landscape. Akbar’s policy of religious conciliation, associated with the abolition of the jizya in 1564, the mazhar of 1582, the Din-i-Ilahi, the translation of the Mahabharata into Persian, and the considerable patronage of Hindu temples and religious institutions, was a major feature of the reign. The policy had been significantly continued by Jahangir and Shah Jahan, both of whom maintained the political marriages with the Rajput royal houses, the patronage of the Hindu temples, and the major representation of Hindu officers in the imperial service. Aurangzeb’s policies represented a significant reversal of the trajectory, and the contrast is debated.
The Historical Debate
The historical debate over Aurangzeb’s religious policies is considerable and ongoing. The traditional view, associated with Jadunath Sarkar and the British colonial historians, treated Aurangzeb as a religious bigot whose policies were the principal cause of the alienation of the empire’s non-Muslim subjects and the subsequent decline. The more nuanced view, dominant in recent scholarship, treats the religious dimension of the late Mughal crisis as part of a broader process of political and cultural change, in which the religious policies were one factor among many. The connection between the religious policies and the broader decline of the Mughal Empire is examined in the economic decline, the rise of the Marathas, the rise of the Sikhs, and the rebellion of 1857 pages.
Sources
- Audrey Truschke, Aurangzeb (2017), chs. 5–7.
- Muzaffar Alam, The Languages of Political Islam in India (2004), ch. 4.