Religious Policies and the Alienation of Subject Communities in the Late Mughal Empire
The religious policies of the late Mughal emperors, and particularly the policies of Aurangzeb, have been among the most contested subjects in South Asian historiography. The traditional view, dominant in both British colonial and early Indian nationalist historiography, treated Aurangzeb’s religious policies as the principal cause of the alienation of the empire’s non-Muslim subjects and the subsequent political fragmentation. The more nuanced view, dominant in recent scholarship, treats the religious dimension of Mughal decline as part of a broader process of cultural and political change in which the Mughal elite’s relationship to its non-Muslim subjects was being renegotiated in a context of social mobility, religious innovation, and political fragmentation. The evidence, however, is substantial that the religious policies of the late empire did contribute to a serious deterioration in the relations between the Mughal state and substantial sections of its subject population.
The Reimposition of the Jizya
The single most consequential religious act of Aurangzeb’s reign was the reimposition of the jizya, the poll tax on non-Muslims that had been abolished by Akbar in 1564 as part of his policy of religious conciliation. The jizya was reimposed in 1679, after consultation with the imperial ulama, and it was enforced rigorously throughout the empire. The reimposition was widely interpreted by the empire’s Hindu subjects as a sign that the Mughal state had abandoned the policy of religious conciliation that had been in place since Akbar’s reign, and it contributed substantially to the sense of alienation that marked the late empire.
The financial yield of the jizya was modest, and the tax’s principal significance was symbolic. The reimposition was a public statement of the regime’s commitment to a more rigorous Islamic policy, and it signalled to the empire’s Hindu subjects that the religious accommodation that had characterised the earlier Mughal period was at an end. The timing of the reimposition, in the same period as the destruction of important Hindu temples and the open conflict with the Rajput and Maratha powers, reinforced the impression of a systematic retreat from the policy of religious conciliation.
The Destruction of Temples
Aurangzeb’s reign was marked by the destruction of a number of important Hindu temples, including the Vishwanath temple at Varanasi, the Keshav Dev temple at Mathura, and the Somnath temple in Gujarat. The destruction of these temples was a serious affront to the religious sensibilities of the empire’s Hindu population, and it is debated. The traditional view, associated with Jadunath Sarkar, treated the temple destructions as evidence of a systematic policy of religious intolerance. The more recent view, associated with historians like Audrey Truschke and others, has argued that the destructions were often responses to specific local circumstances, including the alleged construction of temples on sites of demolished mosques, and that they should be understood in the context of the political conflicts of the period rather than as evidence of a comprehensive anti-Hindu policy.
The political significance of the temple destructions, however, is not in doubt. The destruction of the Vishwanath temple at Varanasi, one of the holiest sites of Hindu pilgrimage, was a major event in the religious history of the period, and it contributed to the sense of grievance that animated the Maratha and Rajput resistance to Mughal authority. The destruction of the Keshav Dev temple at Mathura, on the site of an earlier mosque, was similarly controversial, and the destruction of the Somnath temple, on the traditional site of the famous temple destroyed by Mahmud of Ghazni, was a powerful symbolic act that resonated with the political and religious history of the previous centuries.
The Banishment of Hindu Musicians and Painters
Aurangzeb’s reign also saw the imposition of restrictions on the practice of music and painting at the imperial court, and the dismissal of many of the Hindu musicians and painters who had been prominent in the courts of Akbar, Jahangir, and Shah Jahan. The traditional explanation for these measures was that they reflected a more rigorous Islamic policy that regarded music and painting as religiously questionable. The dismissal of the Hindu musicians and painters had both a religious and an economic dimension: it deprived the imperial court of a substantial body of artistic talent and contributed to the dispersal of the Mughal artistic tradition to the regional successor states.
The successor states of the eighteenth century, particularly Hyderabad, Awadh, and the Rajput courts, became major centres of the traditions of music and painting that had been associated with the imperial court. The dispersal of the Mughal artistic tradition was part of a broader pattern of cultural decentralisation that characterised the eighteenth century, and it contributed to the development of the distinctive regional cultures of the successor states.
The Alienation of the Rajputs
The Rajput alliance had been a cornerstone of Mughal policy since Akbar’s reign, and the political and cultural integration of the Rajput kingdoms into the Mughal order was one of the great achievements of the early empire. The marriage of Akbar to the Rajput princess of Jodhpur, the political marriages of Jahangir and Shah Jahan, and the incorporation of the Rajput rulers into the mansabdari system as honoured members of the imperial nobility all contributed to the integration of the Rajput kingdoms into the Mughal order. Aurangzeb’s accession, however, was accompanied by a deterioration in the relationship, and the policy reversal of the Jodhpur and Mewar marriages of his predecessors was a serious affront to Rajput honour.
The deterioration in the Mughal-Rajput relationship was a major political fact of Aurangzeb’s reign. The Rajput rulers of Jodhpur and Mewar fought a series of wars with the Mughal authorities, and the alliance that had been the cornerstone of Mughal policy for nearly a century was effectively broken. The political consequences were substantial: the Rajput kingdoms, which had previously been reliable allies of the Mughal state, became centres of resistance and contributed to the political fragmentation of the late empire. The rise of the Marathas and the rise of the Sikh power are both incomprehensible without reference to the broader pattern of alienation of the empire’s non-Muslim subjects that characterised Aurangzeb’s reign.
The Conflict with the Sikhs
The Sikh tradition had emerged in the Punjab in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, and the Sikh Gurus had generally maintained good relations with the Mughal authorities. The relationship deteriorated substantially under the later Mughal emperors, particularly Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb. The martyrdom of Guru Arjan, the fifth Guru, in 1606 under the orders of Jahangir was an early indication of the deterioration, and the execution of Guru Tegh Bahadur, the ninth Guru, by Aurangzeb in 1675 was a major event in the history of the Sikh community. Guru Tegh Bahadur was executed, according to Sikh tradition, for refusing to convert to Islam, and his martyrdom is commemorated in the Sikh tradition as a major event in the history of the faith.
The conflict between the Sikh community and the Mughal state intensified under Guru Gobind Singh, the tenth and last of the personal Gurus. Guru Gobind Singh spent much of his life in armed conflict with the Mughal authorities, the Hill Rajputs, and various local adversaries, and in 1699 he founded the Khalsa, the collective of initiated Sikhs who bore the five symbols of the faith. The Khalsa was created in the context of a serious deterioration in the Mughal-Sikh relationship, and the militarisation of the Sikh community was a direct response to the persecution of the community under Aurangzeb’s successors. The rise of the Sikh power is examined in detail in a separate treatment, but the religious dimension of the conflict is an essential part of the broader pattern of alienation that characterised the late empire.
The Conflict with the Marathas
The conflict between the Mughal state and the Maratha power, which began in the late seventeenth century and continued throughout the eighteenth, had a substantial religious dimension. The Maratha state, founded by Shivaji in 1674, drew on a distinctive political ideology that combined the bhakti and shivaji traditions of the western Deccan with a commitment to the protection of Hindu religious institutions. The desecration of Hindu shrines by the Mughal forces in the course of the Deccan campaigns was a major grievance of the Maratha leadership, and the Maratha resistance to Mughal authority was substantially motivated by religious sentiment.
The conflict between Aurangzeb and the Marathas was one of the most prolonged and exhausting military campaigns of the late seventeenth century. The Mughal emperor spent the last twenty-five years of his life in the Deccan, conducting a campaign against the Maratha state that, despite substantial military successes, was never able to suppress the Maratha resistance. The death of Aurangzeb at Ahmednagar in 1707 effectively ended the campaign, and the subsequent release of Shahu, the Maratha prince who had been held in Mughal captivity, marked the beginning of a new phase in the Maratha expansion. The rise of the Marathas is examined in detail in a separate treatment.
The Bhakti and Sikh Movements
The religious conflicts of the late Mughal period were accompanied by a substantial growth of the Bhakti devotional movements in the Hindu community, the consolidation of Sikh identity in the Punjab, and the development of regional religious cultures that challenged the cultural unity of the imperial order. The Bhakti movement, with its emphasis on personal devotion, its rejection of caste distinctions, and its synthesis of Hindu and Sufi themes, had been a major feature of the religious landscape of north India since the late fifteenth century, and it continued to expand in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The growth of regional religious cultures, including the Maratha religious traditions associated with the Warkari movement and the Sikh traditions of the Punjab, contributed to the diversification of the religious landscape that undermined the cultural unity of the imperial order.
The religious policies of the late Mughal empire can only be understood in the context of this broader religious ferment. The Mughal state, with its court culture rooted in Persian and Sunni Islamic traditions, found it increasingly difficult to project a single cultural identity across a religiously diverse empire. The conflicts with the Bhakti and Sikh movements, the Maratha religious traditions, and the various regional religious cultures were part of a broader process of cultural reconfiguration that the Mughal state was unable to control. The economic decline of the Mughal Empire, the rise of the Marathas, and the rise of the Sikh power all had religious dimensions that complemented their political and economic significance.
Conclusion
The religious policies of the late Mughal empire, and particularly the policies of Aurangzeb, contributed substantially to the political fragmentation of the late empire. The reimposition of the jizya, the destruction of important Hindu temples, the banishment of Hindu musicians and painters, and the open conflict with the Rajput, Sikh, and Maratha powers all contributed to a serious deterioration in the relations between the Mughal state and substantial sections of its subject population. The religious dimension of Mughal decline cannot be reduced to a single narrative of religious intolerance, and recent scholarship has emphasised the more complex interaction of political, economic, and religious factors. But the cumulative effect of the religious policies of the late empire was to undermine the legitimacy of the Mughal state and to contribute to the political fragmentation that made possible the rise of the regional successor states, the British East India Company’s expansion, and the eventual rebellion of 1857. For the broader context, the Mughal decline overview, the Mughal history overview, and the reign of Aurangzeb offer comprehensive treatments of the empire’s later religious and political history.
Sources
- Audrey Truschke, Aurangzeb (2017), chs. 5–7.
- Muzaffar Alam, The Languages of Political Islam in India (2004), ch. 4.